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Abstract
Both economic and epidemiological literature have shown that perceived high strain
at work and lack of social infrastructures are good predictors of sick leave. The latter
is particularly relevant in countries where facilities for children and care services
are scarce and women are asked to fill the gap. The Italian 2011 pension reform
significantly restricted age and seniority requirements for retirement, especially for
women in private employment. We investigated whether older Italian employed
women reacted to the postponement of retirement by increasing their sick leave.
The empirical analysis offers unequivocal evidence that this has indeed been the
case, in particular, for low-income grandmothers living in regions with a poor supply
of childcare services. Radical reforms risk losing some of their effectiveness if they are
not accompanied by parallel measures designed to introduce the welfare provisions
previously indirectly and inadequately provided by the pension system, such as
care facilities.
JEL codes: J26, J13, C33
Keywords: Pension reform, Sick leave, Childcare
1 Introduction
The paper investigates whether a hardening of prerequisites for retirement determines an
increase in sick-leave spells taken by workers. It measures the increase by analysing the
response of Italian women to the far-reaching 2011 pension reform, which—approved
under the threat of a financial crisis—significantly and unexpectedly increased the effect-
ive retirement age. The focus is on middle-aged women employed in the private sector, a
group who still enjoyed, before the reform, favourable retirement conditions (possibly as
an implicit ex post compensation for subtle discrimination in the labour market) and
who experienced, because of the rapid transition to the new rules, the sharpest restriction
in the age/seniority requirements for retirement.
The aim of this paper is to look for a possible ‘substitution effect’ between (post-
poned) retirement and sick leave. The exercise is complicated by the fact that recourse
to sick leave by Italian middle-aged women has potentially been influenced, in recent
years, by a number of conflicting forces. On the one hand, unexpected restrictions to
retirement may induce an increase in sick leave for specific health reasons or as a
pretext for attending family chores, such as caring for grandchildren and/or older
family members. This aspect will be the focus of the paper.
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On the other hand, Italy has gone through a severe and prolonged recession that has
reduced household incomes and increased economic vulnerability. With a very sluggish
labour market and high unemployment rates, lay-offs are more likely and absence-
prone workers are typically among the first to be dismissed. Job loss fear can be enough
to reduce absences to the absolute minimum (Leigh 1985). Moreover, the Italian labour
market reform (approved a few months after the pension reform, see Fornero 2014)
reduced employment protection, and economic literature has extensively documented
that there is a positive correlation between employment protection and absenteeism
(Ichino and Riphahn 2005). Finally, sick leave can have negative effects on individuals’
working careers1 with likely consequences also for pension benefits (in Italy still largely
determined, for current and quasi-retirees, according to a defined benefit (DB) formula,
based upon the average salary of the final 10 years).
Our goal is to isolate the ‘pure’ effect of the 2011 Italian pension reform on
absenteeism.
The literature on absenteeism is quite rich. Both economic and epidemiological ana-
lyses have highlighted that perceived high strain at work and poor social provisions are
good predictors of sick leave (Andreassen and Kornstad 2010; Moreau et al. 2004). It
has also been demonstrated that the cost of being absent significantly affects work ab-
sence behaviour (see Johansson and Palme 1996, 2002). Both sick-leave regulation and
its implementation play a key role in determining individuals’ absence choices. Con-
cerning Italy, Scoppa (2010) and Scoppa and Vuri (2014) have pointed out how sick
leave is higher among workers with higher seniority and more stable contracts,
employed in public sector or in big private companies and living in regions with low
unemployment levels. These findings, which refer to the pre-reform situation, are ex-
plained by the authors as the result of workers’ opportunistic behaviour in a country
with low controls and high employment protection.
The literature on the effects of pension reforms, however, has concentrated on the
consequences of a change in retirement rules on wealth accumulation and savings
(Attanasio and Rohwedder 2003); on work and retirement decisions of individuals and
couples (Belloni and Alessie 2009; Colombino et al. 2011); on the adequacy of retirement
resources; on income distribution (Fornero et al. 2010; Borella and Coda Moscarola 2006,
2011); and on long-term employment and growth (Buyse et al. 2013).
To the best of our knowledge, the effects of pension reforms on absenteeism have not
yet been analysed. We found evidence of higher sick-leave absences for low-income
women who were obliged by the reform to postpone retirement and who in 2011, before
the reform (which was approved just before the end of the year), had already experienced
a sick-leave spell. As for women who had not taken any sick leave in 2011, only grand-
mothers reacted to the postponement of retirement, particularly if household income is
low and they are living in regions with a poor supply of childcare services, possibly as a
last resort to cope with caregiving duties towards grandchildren. Their reaction is actually
proportional to the number of years of delay in retirement imposed by the reform.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the Italian
regulatory framework. Section 3 describes the empirical model. Section 4 presents the
data and the descriptive statistics. Estimates on the effects of the pension reform
on absenteeism are presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes by drawing policy
implications.
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2 The Italian regulatory framework
Since our analysis is centred on how reforms shape individuals’ behaviour, we start with
a concise description of the Italian retirement and sick-leave regulations, followed by
an overview of the availability and use of different childcare arrangements.
2.1 The pension system before and after the 2011 reform
The Monti-Fornero reform (law 214/2011)—introduced at a time when it was impera-
tive to act immediately in order to avoid a potentially devastating crisis not only for the
Italian public debt but for the whole Eurozone—was the decisive stage of the very long
and slow restructuring process of the Italian pension system that started in 1992, again
triggered by a financial emergency. While all previous reforms had accommodated an
exasperatingly long phasing in, in 2011, there was little room for gradualism, given the
necessity to reduce pension expenditure in the short to medium run (Fornero 2015).
The reform introduced sharp restrictions to early retirement provisions (such as pure
seniority pensions, formerly awarded almost irrespective of age) and more stringent age
and seniority requirements for normal (old age) retirement. These restrictions affected
women more than men because the law set to equalise requisites across gender by 2018
and because women until then had received more favourable pension treatment, including
more opportunities, with respect to men, to access early retirement provisions.
One of the key features of the new reform was the immediate application, as of
January 1, 2012, of the defined contribution (DC) formula, for all future seniorities
and to all workers, irrespective of their time to retirement. This provision was
meant to reinstate credibility to the DC formula and to do away with the hardly
justifiable differentiations in pension provisions that had been created by the extremely
gradual implementation of the previous reforms, which had thus shifted almost all
the adjustment burden on the shoulders of the younger generation.
Additional file 1: Table S1 compares the pre- and post-reform provisions more
extensively.
2.2 Sick-leave regulations
The Italian sick-leave regulations are based on the principle of not penalising the worker
and therefore of guaranteeing both the salary and the accumulation of pension wealth in
case of sickness. All illness-due absences lasting more than 1 week lead to the so-called
notional contributions which, instead of being paid by the employer/employee, are
financed by health-specific payroll taxes or general taxation, so that sick-leave periods are
recorded for the computation of both eligibility requirements and pension benefit.
Accreditation is conditional on having contributed to the Social Security scheme
for more than 1 week before the start of the illness and, since 2009, has been subject to a
maximum of 96 weeks in the whole working life (INPS 2013).2
2.3 The Italian childcare system
A heterogeneous mix of formal/informal, voluntary/compulsory elements characterises
the Italian childcare system, with strong regional differences and women supplying a
large part of the informal/voluntary services, sometimes acting as substitutes and more
often as complements of the formal care received by children. The informal/voluntary
elements prevail in the pre-school ages, mainly in the 0–3 age group, where places in
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nursery schools are in scarce supply and used on average by only one in ten children,
with great heterogeneity across regions and the south underperforming.3 On the con-
trary, the formal/compulsory elements prevail for the 3–6 age group, with Italy ranking
quite high in Europe for its childcare services: childcare for the 3–6 age group is con-
sidered an official part of the educational path, and thus more standardised; attendance
is voluntary but the take-up rate is quite high.
With inadequate public supply, one would expect the market to fill the gap. Not so
in Italy, where the formal provision of care from private structures (such as those orga-
nised by religious orders) is often considered an imperfect substitute, given their lower
average quality and higher average costs (Del Boca et al. 2005). On the contrary, grand-
parents’ involvement in childcare is widespread, more intense when children are small
and/or do not attend day care. This support is essential to ease the integration of
mothers into the labour market when formal care provision is missing or insufficient,
as school hours are short with respect to the standard working day and access to part-
time positions is inadequate (Ichino and Sanz de Galdeano, 2005; Del Boca et al. 2005;
Keck and Saraceno, 2008).
According to Share data (waves 4 and 5), 45 % of grandmothers are involved in caring
for their grandchildren, almost a quarter of them on a daily basis. According to the
Eusilc data (see Table 1), outside school or pre-school hours, informal caregiving pro-
vided by grandparents or other relatives is by far the most widespread source of care,
while only few families avail themselves of child centres or childminders.
3 The empirical model
3.1 Possible outcomes of an increase in age/seniority requirements
Workers affected by the restrictions of a pension reform can either continue to work or
withdraw from the labour market, living on savings and/or a spouse’s income while
waiting for their pension benefit. In what follows, we only consider those who continue
their working activity. Some of them continue to work with no subsequent increase in
their morbidity rate (or following the trend shown in previous years), while others re-
sort to additional sick leave. This group may consist of workers that effectively experi-
ence worsening health, or subjectively perceive a worsening of their well-being or
simply react negatively to the pension restrictions. Of course, taking sick leave requires
validation by the doctor, which should in principle only be given for the first instance.
However, apart from a lack of controls, there is a ‘grey area’ in which, in the presence
Table 1 Average hours of care outside school or pre-school hours during a usual week by care
provider—Eusilc data 2010














school or pre-school hours)
0.25 (2.13) 0.13 (1.79) 0.43 (2.73) 0.19 (1.99) 0.83 (2.80) 0.54 (2.47)
Childminder 1.10 (5.02) 0.16 (1.72) 0.44 (2.53) 0.10 (1.83) 0.51 (3.19) 0.14 (1.80)
Free or informal arrangements
(grandparents and others)
12.36 (17.44) 4.12 (12.22) 7.87 (11.36) 3.13 (9.31) 5.24 (9.31) 1.76 (6.53)
Observations 487 573 678 478 1862 1492
Source: Author’s elaborations on Eusilc 2010 data; standard errors in parentheses
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of uncertain symptoms, it can be very difficult for doctors to refuse certification (as in
the case of psychological complaints).
Whatever the reasons, our a priori assumption is that sick leave could be the re-
sponse of some workers to the restrictions imposed by the pension reforms, especially
in the case of individuals who had planned early retirement for circumstances that the
reform could not accommodate. This does not mean we are assuming an opportunistic
behaviour on the part of workers (and an accommodating behaviour on the part of doc-
tors); on the contrary, we would like to test whether the disruption of personal life
plans caused by a pension reform results in longer/more frequent sick leave.
Of course, in cases of very serious health conditions, the worker can apply for a dis-
ability pension. However, in this paper, we do not consider this, as we do not have ac-
cess to the archive of disability applications. In any case, since the early 80s, Italy has
adopted a much stricter policy towards disability pensions, and their current number
can be considered physiological (Ragioneria Generale dello Stato 2014).
3.2 The econometric specification
In order to test our hypothesis, we adopted a first differencing (FD) approach and esti-
mated the following equation on a balanced panel referring to the years 2011 and 2012:
ΔY it ¼ Y i2012−Y i2011ð Þ ¼ T þ Zi2012−Zi2011ð Þγ þ αTreatedi2012 þ ui2012−ui2011ð Þ
where Yit is the number of weeks of sick leave in the year t (with t equal to either 2012
or 2011) for the individual i; T is the trend dummy that is equal to 1 in 2012 and 0
otherwise; Zit is a set of individual and regional time-varying explanatory variables
measured at time t and uit is the time t individual-specific error term. We used the
panel dimension to compute seniority and other retirement requisites but, because of
data limitations, we only considered the responses in year 2012, i.e. the ‘first’ reaction
to the reform.
The reaction was measured by the estimated coefficient of the dummy variable
Treated. Treated is equal to 1 in the case of the worker’s retirement having been post-
poned by the 2011 pension reform, 0 if she is unaffected by the reform, i.e. belongs to
the control group (the reform did not affect workers who, according to the pre-reform
provisions, could retire in 2012). Treatment in year 2011 is zero for both groups. If being
affected by the reform had a positive impact on the number of sick-leave weeks, α is
positive. To better investigate the effect, we tried different specifications of the model.
4 Data and descriptive statistics
The analysis is based on data from an administrative data set provided by the Italian
Social Security Institute (INPS), the so-called Estratti Conto archive.4 This archive col-
lects information related to the workers’ contribution periods for every INPS pension
scheme (initial and final dates of each contribution period); a classification of contribu-
tions (regular employed work, sick leave, maternity leave, unemployment, etc.) and
gross earnings, used to compute payrolls and pension benefits. The INPS provided a
sample from this archive containing registered individuals born on the first and the
ninth of each month of each year. The data are updated on December 31, 2012, which
means that the sample contains information on the working lives of the selected indi-
viduals from the date of their first contribution to any of the INPS schemes up to the
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end of 2012. The archive however provides no information on seniority accrued in
different pension schemes (i.e. as civil servants or as freelance professionals), making it
thus impossible to get a complete picture for workers with mixed careers.5 Moreover, it
only reports illness-due absences lasting 1 week or longer. It also provides very limited
information on the individuals’ socio-demographic characteristics, namely year of birth
(and death), gender and region of residence.
We identified mothers and women in charge of informal caregiving by observing ma-
ternity and caregiving leave. We denote as ‘grandmothers’ those women who experi-
enced maternity leave before 1995. We acknowledge that not all women who took
maternity leave in their youth will have actually become grandmothers, but the data do
not provide for a more accurate definition.
We focused on the sub-sample of women registered in the private-sector employees’
scheme (Fondo Pensione Lavoratori Dipendenti, FPLD), born between 1947 and 1959,
and not yet retired in 2012 as they had not reached pension eligibility in 2011. The data
provided information on this group’s spells of work and sick leave from 1962 to 31st
December 2012. After refining our sample by excluding some special cases,6 we ended
up with a balanced panel of 25,258 women still at work in 2011 and 2012 and analysed
the determinants of the variation in the length of their sick-leave spells between
2011 and 2012.
We used a simulation procedure to identify the ‘treated’ group, i.e. the women com-
pelled by the reform to delay retirement. Starting from observed age and seniority in
2012, we simulated the retirement year for each woman in the sample by considering
the age/seniority requisites to access either early or old-age retirement under the pre-
and post-reform rules and under the hypothesis of a continuous (future) career. The
assessment of pension requirements refers to 1st of December of each year (in some
cases, this requires the month and the date of birth, which we randomly assign,
further assuming that they are all born on the last day of the month).7
According to our simulations, as a consequence of the reform, about 74 % of our
sample experienced a 1–6 years’ increase in the retirement requisites, with an average
3-year delay. These women represent our ‘treated group’, while the remaining 26 %
make up the ‘control group’ (see Table 2).
Due to the joint effect of the new age/seniority requirements and of the heterogeneity
in workers’ ages and seniority at the time of the reform, the time profile of the delay is
hump-shaped (see Table 3). The average increase is 3.5 years for women aged 56; about
Table 2 Delay in retirement (years) imposed on women in private employment by the reform
Years of delay in retirement
imposed by the reform










Source: Our simulations on INPS data
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2 years for those under 56 and from 60 onwards and 4 years for those aged 57–59.
Women aged 62+ were unaffected by the reform. It should be noted that these require-
ments only refer to the rather generous (at least with respect to paid-in contributions)
DB pension formula. Indeed, we did not simulate retirement according to the transi-
tional DC option because very few women in the observed sample chose to retire with
that formula, given the significant reduction in benefits with respect to the DB formula.
As for sick leave, about 33 % (1.8 out of 5.2 million) of women in private employment
had at least one in 2012. However, 82 % of sick leave lasted less than 7 days (INPS
health insurance archives, 2013 data, p. 4). On average, considering both 2011 and
2012, only 3 % of the sample had a sick leave spell lasting more than 7 days, thus
determining a credit of notional contributions.
Table 4 completes the picture with additional descriptive statistics. The table shows
that the control and the treatment groups do not differ significantly in terms of sick
leave spells, unemployment, seniority or the other observable individual or regional
characteristics.
5 Results
In the estimations presented in this section, our dependent variable is the variation
in the individuals’ number of sick-leave weeks that occurred in year 2012 with
respect to year 2011.
In our baseline specification (model 1), the set of regressors included a dummy
capturing the time trend between 2011 and 2012 (T) and a dummy identifying treated
workers (Treated). The estimated coefficient of the latter variable captured the different
reactions of individuals obliged to postpone retirement by the pension reform with
respect to those not affected. We also controlled for a set of individual-specific
Table 3 Size of control and treatment groups by age
Age Control group Treatment group
Observations Observations Average number of years of delay
53 971 3349 1.833
54 649 3337 2.268
55 864 2894 2.755
56 910 2564 3.500
57 751 2185 3.996
58 639 1746 4.339
59 390 1409 4.292
60 263 1205 2.601






Mean age 57.01 55.74
Mean delay (years) 3.00
Source: Our elaborations on INPS data
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characteristics, i.e. the individuals’ variations in seniority, in the interaction between
seniority and age, in the number of weeks of notional contribution during the whole
(observed) working life, in the age squared, in the logarithm of the gross weekly wage
and in the regional unemployment rate. All seniority variables were measured at
the beginning of each year. As usual for an FD setting, the effect of time-invariant
regressors cancels out and the influence of the variation in age could not be separated
from the time trend.
In model 1, we observed a negative time trend in sick-leave absences and a positive
effect of the treatment. The former was significant at usual standard significance levels.
The effect of the other control variables was generally in line with previous findings: an
increase in seniority corresponded to higher absences, but here, such an effect
depended negatively on age; an increase in notional contribution periods reduced the
weeks of absence, probably because they were excluded from effective seniority
computation and an increase in gross wage and in regional unemployment rates
was negatively correlated with absences.
In model 2, we tested whether grandmothers behave differently from non-
grandmothers by adding an interaction term between the dummy Treated and the
Table 4 Descriptive statistics of the sample
Year 2012 Year 2011
Variables Obs Mean Std. dev. Mean Std. dev.
Treatment group
Weeks of sick leave 18,708 0.12 1.00 0.11 0.91
Delay in retirement due to Monti-Fornero reform (years) 18,708 3.00 1.77 0.00 0.00
Seniority (weeks) 18,708 1389.99 424.95 1337.33 425.11
Sick-leave weeks in the whole career 18,708 2.00 7.48 1.89 7.26
Sick-leave and unemployment weeks in the whole career 18,708 16.14 36.52 16.03 36.45
Age 18,708 55.74 2.15 54.74 2.15
Weekly wage (euro) 18,708 481.02 243.65 473.59 238.63
Grandmothers 18,708 0.41 0.49 0.41 0.49
With a sick spell in t-1 18,708 0.03 0.16 0.03 0.16
North 18,708 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50
Centre 18,708 0.37 0.48 0.37 0.48
South 18,708 0.13 0.34 0.13 0.34
Control group
Weeks of sick leave 6550 0.11 0.98 0.11 0.92
Seniority (weeks) 6550 1418.41 679.83 1365.60 679.59
Sick-leave weeks in the whole career 6550 1.43 5.57 1.33 5.38
Sick-leave and unemployment weeks in the whole career 6550 11.95 34.88 11.85 34.84
Age 6550 57.01 3.23 56.01 3.23
Weekly wage (euro) 6550 477.92 261.54 463.30 227.80
Grandmothers 6550 0.43 0.50 0.43 0.50
With a sick spell in t-1 6550 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.15
North 6550 0.54 0.50 0.54 0.50
Centre 6550 0.35 0.48 0.35 0.48
South 6550 0.11 0.31 0.11 0.31
Source: Our elaborations
Coda Moscarola et al. IZA Journal of European Labor Studies  (2016) 5:1 Page 8 of 18
dummy identifying grandmothers (Grandmothers). We found that the coefficient of this
interaction dummy was positive and statistically significant. Grandmothers on average
reacted to the reform by increasing their weeks of sick leave, while non-grandmothers
showed no significant reaction to the reform.
In model 3, we accounted for personal sick-leave histories as we interpreted sick-
leave spells in the pre-reform setting as a proxy for a general worsening of health con-
ditions. We used the dummy identifying individuals with a sick-leave spell in 2011, and
we made it interact with the time trend (T), the treatment dummy (Treated) and the
interaction dummy (Treated*grandmothers). We found relevant differences in the be-
haviour of the two groups. First, the statistical significance of the negative time trend in
sick leave persisted only for the individuals with no sick-leave spell in 2011. Second,
women observed to have taken a sick-leave spell in 2011 actually reacted to the treat-
ment by increasing their sick leave in 2012. Women with no sick-leave spells in 2011
reacted to the treatment much less and only if they were grandmothers. Our interpret-
ation is that among women who had not yet experienced a sick-leave spell in 2011, and
could then be considered to be in a relatively better health condition, a reaction to
the delayed retirement was observed only when they were involved in caring activities
with their grandchildren (Table 5).
Table 5 Regression results I: FD-dependent variable: variation in weeks of sick leave between 2011
and 2012
Model 1 (b/se) Model 2 (b/se) Model 3 (b/se)
T −0.377** (0.152) −0.413*** (0.155)
Treated 0.015 (0.015) −0.005 (0.015)
Treated* grandmother 0.048*** (0.015)
Tsick in 2011 −0.227 (0.211)
Tnot sick in 2011 −0.393** (0.154)
Treatedsick in 2011 0.389** (0.182)
Treatednot sick in 2011 −0.016 (0.015)
Treated*grandmothersick in 2011 0.120 (0.197)
Treated*grandmothernot sick in 2011 0.044*** (0.015)
ΔSeniority 0.003*** (0.001) 0.004*** (0.001) 0.003*** (0.001)
ΔSeniority*age −0.000*** (0.000) −0.000*** (0.000) −0.000*** (0.000)
ΔNotional seniority −0.863*** (0.018) −0.863*** (0.018) −0.926*** (0.024)
ΔAge2 0.005*** (0.001) 0.005*** (0.001) 0.005*** (0.001)
ΔLog (wage) −0.195*** (0.070) −0.197*** (0.070) −0.205***(0.070)
ΔRegional unemployment rate −0.003 (0.008) −0.002 (0.008) −0.001 (0.008)
Adjusted R-square 0.391 0.391 0.394
N 25,258 25,258 25,258
Tests (P values)
Tsick in 2011 = Tnot sick in 2011 0.2555
Treatedsick in 2011 = Treatednot sick in 2011 0.0264
Treatedi + (Treated*grandmotheri) = 0 0.0183
i = sick in 2011 0.0120
i = not sick in 2011 0.1147
Note: Significance levels: *0.10, **0.05, and ***0.01. Robust errors clustered at level of groups with uniform age, sick leave
in 2011, income, seniority level and region
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In model 4, we shed further light on the issue, investigating whether the income level
of the household played a role in sick-leave behaviour; to this purpose, on the basis of
their gross wage in 2011, we split the sample into three groups: low-, medium- and
high-income individuals. Interestingly, estimated coefficients preserved their statistical
significance only in the low-income sample. In particular, the results related to the women
with no sick-leave spells in 2011 supported the idea that sick leave is an option mainly for
grandmothers without sufficient economic resources to buy care in the market.
Finally, in model 5, we differentiated between the reactions of grandmothers to the
treatment on the basis of the coverage rates of services for children in the region of
residence. We divided the regions of residence into three groups: low, medium and
high coverage-rate regions.8 Among individuals with no sick-leave spells in 2011, we
found evidence of a stronger reaction to the reform from low-income grandmothers
living in low coverage-rate regions. This result supported the idea that not only income
levels but also the availability of (public and private) childcare services influence the
grandmothers’ recourse to sick leave. The results related to individuals with a sick-
leave spell in 2011 were not so reliable, due to the small sample size of many of the
sub-groups of grandmothers identified in Table 6 on the basis of their income and of
the coverage rate of services for children in their region of residence.
We then used the delay in retirement (Delay) in place of the dummy identifying
treated workers (Treated). The delay is the number of years of postponed retirement
induced by the reform (values are rounded up to the nearest integer). For the control
group, the variable Delay is zero. As above, we tried different specifications; the results
are shown in Tables 7 and 8. This new set of regressions confirmed previous findings
and showed that the effect of the treatment was actually proportional to the number of
years of delay in retirement at least for the group of individuals that had not already
taken sick leave in 2011.
In order to quantify the effects previously described, we ran some simulations starting
from the estimated coefficients in models 5 and 6. For women observed to have already
been on sick leave in 2011, the average number of sick-leave weeks was 4.12. The
model predicted a decrease in sick-leave absences of about −3.55 weeks for individuals
not affected by the reform, which becomes −3.16 for those affected by the reform.
Concerning the individuals not sick in 2011, our model predicted an increase in sick-
leave absences of about 0.094 weeks for individuals not affected by the reform. As for
the workers obliged by the pension reform to postpone retirement, the increase was
reduced to 0.078 weeks for non-grandmothers, while it increased to 0.122 weeks for
grandmothers. These numbers, although appearing very small, hide important varia-
tions in relative terms, for example, within the group of women with no sick leave in
2011, the predicted number of weeks of sick leave for our sample of treated grand-
mothers was about 30 % higher than for the women not affected by the reform. Among
low-income earners, the predicted variation was on average equal to 0.083 weeks for
non-treated and rose to 0.19 (+130 %) for grandmothers obliged to postpone retire-
ment and living in regions with low provision of care facilities for children.
Furthermore, as we could only dispose of information on sick-leave spells lasting
more than one week, our calculations probably underestimated the phenomenon.
A set of robustness checks, including a sensitivity test for the assumptions about the
month of birth, a strict exogeneity test, a sensitivity test of the results to the timing of
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Table 6 Regression results I. FD-dependent variable: variation in weeks of sick leave between 2011 and 2012
Model 4 Model 5
Low income (b/se) Medium income (b/se) High income (b/se) Low income (b/se) Medium income (b/se) High income (b/se)
Tsick in 2011 −0.581** (0.277) 0.396 (0.494) 0.512 (0.582) −0.583** (0.277) 0.376 (0.491) 0.529 (0.594)
Tnot sick in 2011 −0.679*** (0.242) 0.175 (0.339) −0.020 (0.187) −0.684*** (0.241) 0.167 (0.337) 0.050 (0.184)
Treatedsick in 2011 0.540** (0.235) 0.188 (0.312) −0.040 (0.521) 0.539** (0.235) 0.190 (0.312) −0.013 (0.526)
Treatednot sick in 2011 0.016 (0.025) −0.040 (0.033) −0.007 (0.015) 0.016 (0.025) −0.040 (0.033) −0.007 (0.015)
Treated*grandmothersick in 2011 0.032 (0.287) 0.104 (0.303) 0.828 (0.550)
Treated* grandmothernot sick in 2011 0.063** (0.028) 0.052 (0.032) 0.013 (0.016)
Treated*grandmother
Sick in 2011, low-coverage region −0.064 (0.343) 0.309 (0.463) 2.324** (1.025)
Sick in 2011, medium-coverage region −0.079 (0.567) −0.525** (0.244) 0.404 (0.682)
Sick in 2011, high-coverage region 0.214 (0.477) 0.288 (0.401) 0.175 (0.677)
Not sick in 2011, low-coverage region 0.090** (0.041) 0.027 (0.044) 0.025 (0.025)
Not sick in 2011, medium-coverage region 0.036 (0.037) 0.033 (0.055) −0.013 (0.017)
Not sick in 2011, high-coverage region 0.041 (0.044) 0.098* (0.057) 0.006 (0.016)
Adjusted R-square 0.515 0.315 0.240 0.515 0.316 0.246
N 8420 8419 8419 8420 8419 8419
Tests (P values)
Tsick in 2011 = Tnot sick in 2011 0.5105 0.5063 0.3262 0.5042 0.5272 0.3777
Treatedsick in 2011 = Treatednot sick in 2011 0.0269 0.4679 0.9493 0.0271 0.4633 0.9907
Treatedi + (Treated*grandmotheri) = 0
i = sick in 2011 0.0459 0.4413 0.1424
















Table 6 Regression results I. FD-dependent variable: variation in weeks of sick leave between 2011 and 2012 (Continued)
In low-coverage regions
i = sick in 2011 0.1836 0.3415 0.0191
i = not sick in 2011 0.0160 0.8046 0.5047
In medium-coverage regions
i = sick in 2011 0.4146 0.3232 0.6225
i = not sick in 2011 0.1753 0.9045 0.3176
In high-coverage regions
i = sick in 2011 0.1069 0.2907 0.7865
i = not sick in 2011 0.2194 0.3386 0.9539
Note: Significance levels: *0.10, **0.05, and ***0.01. Robust errors clustered at level of groups with uniform age, sick leave in 2011, income, seniority level and region. All the regressions control for variations in
seniority, in the interaction between seniority and age, in the number of weeks of notional contribution during the whole (observed) working life, in the age squared, in the logarithm of the gross weekly wage and in
















retirement and a placebo test on the effects of the treatment, is described and reported
in the appendices (Additional file 2).
6 Conclusions
The paper analyses the response of women, in terms of sick-leave utilisation, to a pen-
sion reform that restricts access conditions to retirement. To the best of our know-
ledge, it is the first attempt of this kind.
We apply the analysis to Italy, which provides a particularly good case study, almost
a ‘quasi-natural’ experiment, for three different reasons. First, the reform—undertaken
under the threat of a financial crisis and strongly advocated by international institutions
as a public expenditure stabiliser—was quite radical and only allowed for a very short
transition period. In this sense, the reform was largely unanticipated by the public. Second,
women, who had been largely sheltered from the effects of previous reforms, experienced
the most extensive postponement of their retirement age, because the reform drastically
reduced the so-called seniority pensions, which provided an extremely favourable access
to early retirement. Third, Italy suffers from a lack of public care facilities, and women
traditionally are called upon to compensate this deficiency within the family.
Table 7 Regression results II. FD-dependent variable: variation in weeks of sick leave between 2011
and 2012
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
b/se b/se b/se
T −0.329** (0.145) −0.359** (0.146)
Delay 0.003 (0.003) −0.003 (0.003)
Delay*grandmother 0.017*** (0.005)
Tsick in 2011 0.023 (0.197)
Tnot sick in 2011 −0.343** (0.145)
Delaysick in 2011 0.043 (0.040)
Delaynot sick in 2011 −0.005 (0.003)
Delay*grandmothersick in 2011 0.032 (0.049)
Delay*grandmothernot sick in 2011 0.015*** (0.004)
ΔSeniority 0.003*** (0.001) 0.003*** (0.001) 0.003*** (0.001)
ΔSeniority*age −0.000*** (0.000) −0.000*** (0.000) −0.000*** (0.000)
ΔNotional seniority −0.863*** (0.018) −0.864*** (0.018) −0.927*** (0.023)
ΔAge2 0.005*** (0.001) 0.005*** (0.001) 0.005*** (0.001)
ΔLog (wage) −0.196*** (0.069) −0.198*** (0.069) −0.209*** (0.069)
ΔRegional unemployment rate −0.003 (0.008) −0.002 (0.008) −0.001 (0.008)
Adjusted R-square 0.391 0.391 0.394
N 25,258 25,258 25,258
Tests (P values)
Tsick in 2011 = Tnot sick in 2011 0.0067
Delaysick in 2011 = Delaynot sick in 2011 0.2375
Delayi + (Delay*grandmotheri) = 0 0.0026
i = sick in 2011 0.1165
i = not sick in 2011 0.0163
Note: Significance levels: *0.10, **0.05, and ***0.01. Robust errors clustered at level of groups with uniform age, sick leave
in 2011, income, seniority level and region
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Table 8 Regression results I. FD-dependent variable: variation in weeks of sick leave between 2011 and 2012
Model 4 Model 5
Low income (b/se) Medium income (b/se) High income (b/se) Low income (b/se) Medium income (b/se) High income (b/se)
Tsick in 2011 −0.121 (0.289) 0.543 (0.408) 0.496 (0.441) −0.114 (0.284) 0.551 (0.405) 0.489 (0.478)
Tnot sick in 2011 −0.462* (0.237) 0.162 (0.313) −0.023 (0.172) −0.460* (0.236) 0.143 (0.310) 0.024 (0.171)
Delaysick in 2011 0.058 (0.049) 0.017 (0.064) −0.029 (0.084) 0.058 (0.049) 0.010 (0.064) −0.031 (0.087)
Delaynot sick in 2011 −0.003 (0.005) −0.006 (0.007) −0.004 (0.003) −0.003 (0.005) −0.007 (0.007) −0.004 (0.003)
Delay*grandmothersick in 2011 0.009 (0.067) 0.005 (0.074) 0.272* (0.143)
Delay*grandmothernot sick in 2011 0.018** (0.008) 0.014 (0.009) 0.009 (0.005)
Delay*grandmother
sick in 2011, low-coverage region 0.037 (0.093) −0.007 (0.096) 0.514** (0.258)
sick in 2011, medium-coverage region −0.027 (0.114) −0.171** (0.070) 0.268 (0.196)
sick in 2011, high-coverage region 0.001 (0.117) 0.073 (0.102) 0.048 (0.163)
not sick in 2011, low-coverage region 0.029** (0.011) 0.000 (0.010) 0.014 (0.009)
not sick in 2011, medium-coverage region 0.007 (0.011) 0.020 (0.019) −0.003 (0.005)
not sick in 2011, high-coverage region 0.011 (0.012) 0.029* (0.016) 0.005 (0.005)
Adjusted R-square 0.515 0.315 0.240 0.515 0.316 0.246
N 8420 8419 8419 8420 8419 8419
Tests (P values)
Tsick in 2011 = Tnot sick in 2011 0.0373 0.1648 0.1648 0.0308 0.1339 0.2495
Treatedsick in 2011 = Treatednot sick in 2011 0.2161 0.7218 0.7218 0.2146 0.8000 0.7542
Treatedi + (Treated*grandmotheri) = 0
i = sick in 2011 0.2923 0.7213 0.7913
















Table 8 Regression results I. FD-dependent variable: variation in weeks of sick leave between 2011 and 2012 (Continued)
In low-coverage regions
i = sick in 2011 0.3418 0.9773 0.0694
i = not sick in 2011 0.0230 0.4894 0.2782
In medium-coverage regions
i = sick in 2011 0.7705 0.0554 0.2591
i = not sick in 2011 0.7158 0.4829 0.2081
In high-coverage regions
i = sick in 2011 0.5872 0.4250 0.8862
i = not sick in 2011 0.5158 0.1429 0.8708
Note: Significance levels: *0.10, **0.05, and ***0.01. Robust errors clustered at level of groups with uniform age, sick leave in 2011, income, seniority level and region. All the regressions control for variations in
seniority, in the interaction between seniority and age, in the number of weeks of notional contribution during the whole (observed) working life, in the age squared, in the logarithm of the gross weekly wage and in
















We found evidence of women’s response to changes in pension rules. Such a re-
sponse differed according to their past sick-leave records and income levels. Low-
income female workers who in 2011 had already experienced a sick-leave spell, and
were forced by the pension reform to postpone retirement, appeared to increase the
total amount of time on sick leave. Low-income women who did not have a sick-leave
spell in 2011 behaved in the same manner but less intensively and only if they benefited
from maternity leave in their youth (our ‘conjectured’ grandmothers), presumably en-
gaged in care activities for their grandchildren. For the latter group, moreover, the mea-
sured increase was proportional to the number of years of pension delay introduced by
the 2011 reform. This evidence is particularly significant for women living in regions
with low provision of care services for children.
We cannot say (and we do not want to suggest) that our findings concerning grand-
mothers point to opportunistic behaviour. Indeed, a careful consideration of our results
seems to support a different view, i.e. that given the abovementioned chronic lack of
well-structured, high-quality care facilities, and the necessity for middle-aged women to
compensate for them with informal care, it is likely that sick leave provided a kind of
last resort response.
This exercise calls for wide-ranging policy considerations. In particular, when a
fundamental social reform is introduced with great speed, in order to immediately
reduce public pension expenditure and to improve its medium-long-term sustain-
ability, it is only natural for it to produce negative collateral effects. When, as was
the case for Italy prior to the reform, the pension system is used as a catch-all
remedy for various kinds of social imbalances, even a radical reform risks losing effect-
iveness if it is not accompanied by parallel measures meant to fill the gaps. True, this can
hardly be done in an emergency, although some relief could be provided by issuing ad
hoc vouchers aimed at filling specific gaps, like the ones in care services that have been
highlighted in the paper.
Our final point is that the ultimate success of a pension reform depends on
many factors. Information and financial literacy that boost understanding of the re-
forms certainly facilitate their acceptance (Boeri and Tabellini 2012; Fornero 2015).
A key role is also played by welfare policies specifically aimed to alleviate the bur-
den of care activities that fall on women, particularly in Mediterranean countries.
This requires massive structural improvements in care facilities. Working grand-
mothers would be less inclined to take sick leave if families could rely on public
financial help to substitute at least the most important care activities they still
heavily perform.
Endnotes
1No estimate for Italy is available but for Norway, Markussen (2012) estimated that a
1 % increase in sick-leave rates leads to a drop in earnings of about 1.2 % in the
following 2 years.
2Illness episodes are automatically registered in the monthly individual records
(denunce individuali mensili, EMens) and reported in the INPS ‘Estratti Conto’ archive;
to get notional payroll accreditation, workers have to apply instead.
3For the 0–3 age group, the 2009 coverage rate of public structures is 13 %, ranging
from 3 in Campania to 31 in Emilia-Romagna (Istituto degli Innocenti 2013).
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4Since 2012, the Estratti Conto archive has been publicly available for research.
See: http://www.cliclavoro.gov.it/Barometro-Del-Lavoro/Pagine/Microdati-per-la-
ricerca.aspx.
5Although we cannot reconstruct their precise number, we can indirectly assume this
to be rather limited because of, first, the traditionally low mobility characterising the
Italian labour market; second, the obstacles to the transition from public to private
employment or from self-employment to a dependent position.
6From an initial sample of 7,169,385 contribution periods, we dropped: very early
starters (before the age of 15); workers having special pension provisions or exceeding
96 weeks of notional payroll or having made no contribution in 2012 or wage ‘outliers’;
having more than 52 weeks of seniority in 2011 and 2012 and aged 65+ with less than
15 years’ contribution by 2012. We also excluded individuals who were unemployed
(mobilità, cassa integrazione e disoccupazione) in 2012. More information is available
upon request.
7The sensitivity analysis of this assumption can be found in Additional file 2: Tables S2
and S3.
8As a proxy for the overall intensity of formal care services, we used the coverage rate
of care services for children aged 0–2 by region measured at 1/9/2011 provided by the
Istituto degli Innocenti (2013), p. 35 (Tavola 2—Tasso di copertura nei servizi educativi
che accolgono bambini 0–2 al 1.9.2011).
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